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Abstract  
Notwithstanding extensive analysis on the pros and cons of Chinese-African 
involvement, there has not been much in development of a collective African policy 
framework for economic engagement with China. This paper seeks to shift focus 
from the debate on the pros and cons of Chinese – Africa relations to arguing that 
time is auspicious  for Africa to develop common policy measures to manage China 
and making provisional policy proposals on how to do that. The paper’s argument is 
twofold; first, an incipient African disenchantment over China [as outlined in the 
post-FOCAC 2009 AU report] provides a prod to coalesce an African ‘Chinese 
policy’ to manage China-Africa relations. Secondly, if widely adopted, an African 
‘Chinese policy’ would not only refine a coordinated continental response to China 
but would also enhance consolidate regional convergence in key policy areas in 
Africa. This paper proposes pragmatic policies for embracing China – beyond praise 
or criticism. 
Keywords: Africa-China policy, regional integration, economic diplomacy 
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CCS discussion papers should contribute to the academic debate on China’s global rise and the 
consequences thereof for African development. We do therefore explicitly invite scholars from Africa, 
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not least to obtain input from other colleagues in the field. Discussion papers should thus be seen as 
work in progress, exposed to (and ideally stimulating) policy-relevant discussion based on academic 
standards. 
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INTRODUCTION   
 
With China determinedly asserting its role in economic relations with African countries, debate 
on the effect of the Chinese commercial expansion to Africa has been fierce and Chinese 
rebuttals predictable. With particular regard to China‟s development assistance and its 
burgeoning business with the continent, African countries have expressed a collective1 hurray of 
appreciation for their expanded range of alternatives in supply of investment and aid. This 
appeal is predicated on China‟s role as a countervailing force to both Western conditionality and 
to the continent‟s reliance on Western sources for foreign investment and development 
assistance (Alden, 2008). On the other hand, some segments of the so called „traditional donors‟ 
have erupted in dismay not only at their increasingly weakened position in influencing Africa 
through aid but also at China‟s audacity in ruffling the existing aid architecture. For most of 
Africa2, Chinese development assistance and commercial aspirations offers a formidable foil to 
western (traditional) economies. By offering alternatives to aid-receiving countries, emerging 
donors, particularly China are introducing competitive pressures that constitute a serious 
challenge to the existing multilateral development regime (Woods, 2008).  For Africa, this seems 
to be a good time. The pressure on traditional donors (and economies) presents an opportunity 
for increased independence and leverage for African external economic relations.  
Incidentally, the criticism of China coming out of the sidelines of the Fourth Ministerial Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Egypt in November 2009, may signal 
diminishing goodwill on Africa‟s part over China. This was the first major meeting between 
African countries and China since the outbreak of the global economic crisis and its eventual 
containment. At the meeting several high ranking African Ministers3 censured China‟s style 
of economic relations with Africa. Africa‟s subtle dissatisfaction with the conduct of China-
Africa relations was also expressed in the African Union‟s post-FOCAC report.4  
As this paper proposes, rather than merely vacillating between excitement and loathing over 
China, Africa should „tie down Gulliver‟ while the goodwill between the two is high. This paper 
proposes concrete supranational policy action plans for responding to China‟s growing 
economic engagement with Africa. Although there has been much elucidation on the pros and 
cons of Chinese African involvement, there has not been much in terms of development of a 
                                                             
1 „China Praised for African links‟– The BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8301826.stm (accessed 23rd 
April 2010) 
 “COMESA ministers highly praise China-Africa cooperation forum fruits” Xinhua November 17, 2006 
2 “Africa warns China: Money is not enough” 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/KL09Cb01.html 
3 Notable were the Nigerian and Libyan Foreign Ministers. The two countries strong leverage using oil 
resources grants them the political independence to criticize China but its unlikely that disaffection is 
limited to these two only. See the link above (footnote 2) 
4 Among other things the AU expressed dissatisfaction with and urged China to do were; (a) Simplify the 
lending procedures of its financial institutions, (b) advocate for and support African courses in ASEAN, 
G20 and other fora and (c) allow preferential entry of semi-finished African goods into the Chinese 
market and to allow greater technology transfer to firms in Africa. For more see Report of the AU 
Commission on Africa‟s Strategic Relationships (EX.CL/544 (XVI) January 2010. 
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collective policy framework for engaging China, with the notable exception of policy proposals 
made by Kaplinsky and Farooki (2009).  
This paper seeks to contribute to enhancement of Afro-Chinese economic relations by shifting 
focus from the debate on the pros and cons of Chinese involvement in Africa to arguing that 
time is ripe for Africa to develop unified policy measures to manage China and making 
provisional policy proposals on how to do that. The key argument of the paper is twofold; first, 
a nascent disenchantment over China provides a veritable prod to coalesce an African „Chinese 
policy‟ to manage China-Africa relations. Secondly, that if widely adopted, an African „Chinese 
policy‟ would not only refine a coordinated continental response to China but would also help 
consolidate regional convergence in key policy areas. 
The paper is divided into four main parts. The immediate section deals with two key ideational 
opportunities provided by the Chinese foray into Africa regarding policymaking. Although many 
positive outcomes of the Chinese involvement have been discussed, the ideational benefits to 
Africa‟s policymaking – as opposed to merely increased alternatives in capitalization and Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) – have not been duly captured. The following section deals with the 
justifications for a unified African policy. In doing so, the paper first questions the accuracy of 
the now putative notion of collective „African‟ relations with China. The aggregation of African 
interests, threats and benefits from China is misleading. Chinese relations with African countries 
- in trade, investment and aid - are overwhelmingly bilateral and the paper argues that if not 
addressed early, this predominantly bilateral approach will likely stymie rather than aid regional 
integration processes. Further the paper addresses the rising pitfalls of the Chinese business 
practices at the national level in African countries and how increasingly robust Chinese 
involvement in the continent is ruffling local business communities. In spite of a seemingly 
widespread government approval of Chinese involvement, there is a growing vexation and 
alienation of local business entities. Is there a growing disconnect between governments and 
domestic business groups? Finally the paper will broach and discuss policy propositions for 
anticipating and regulating Africa-Chinese economic relations. 
 
CHINA-  AFRICA  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  –  
IDEATIONAL  BENEFITS 
 
Much of the politics of newly revamped Afro-Chinese relations revolve around the extent to 
which China has diversified African sources of capitalization in foreign investment and Official 
Development Assistance beyond so called traditional donors. With regard to ODA, the relative 
opacity of Chinese aid infrastructure in comparison with established OECD 5  practices for 
instance, has been an issue of concern. One of these concerns regards China‟s perceived 
leniency in granting aid or grants to African nations. In spite of its growing ODA, China has not 
stamped its foot on the policy priorities of its debtors unlike the traditional practice of 
conditionality by traditional donors.  For many years, the aid infrastructure of the OECD has 
had elements of „conditionality‟ and Chinese aid is seen as having less conditionality. Aid 
                                                             
5 In this paper, I use the OECD to cover what are considered the traditional donors.  
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conditionality is a set of requirements that donors demand of the recipient countries to induce 
certain desired economic or political reforms.  Hilde Selbervik (1999) has argued that 
conditionality has an essentially coercive element since „the donor is seeking to induce the 
recipient to pursue certain goals and adopt certain policies which the recipient would otherwise 
not have given equally high priorities‟. In other words, although it is difficult to quantify the 
magnitude, there has been a sense that traditional donors‟ ODA skewed African policymaking 
from its own domestic priorities. Traditional ODA is thus seen as having the effect of 
constraining and constricting the „policy-space‟ of African countries.  The section below details 
two critical ways in which China is boosting the psychological resources of Africa‟s development 
by expanding domestic policy ownership and enhancing Africa‟s negotiation capabilities.  
DILUTION OF CONDITION ALITY -  DELINKING AID FROM DO MESTIC 
PRIORITIES   
 
The loss of the power to prioritize their economic programmes based on their own vision has 
often meant that African countries have had to look for consent or approval of their 
programmes from donors. The notion of seeking approval has been very present in African 
policy-making where almost every major national economic policy decision has had to have the 
backing of major multilateral donors. For instance, since the 1990s African countries economic 
planning blueprints (the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, PRSPs) are closely managed and 
evaluated by the World Bank and the IMF. These institutions in fact proudly claim to have 
launched the PRS initiative6. This calls into question the level of policy ownership by African 
governments.  
National development is not merely an increase in material resources but a growth in the 
collective psychological resources (confidence) of a country. An essential question in the 
psychology of national development is what type and quality of national psyche is relatively 
more amenable to generating and sustaining development, at both personal and societal levels 
(Bhola, 1990)? As Inkeles and Smith (1974) noted, two core psychological attributes are essential 
to development; (i) a basic threshold of individual responsibility and planning, and (ii) freedom 
from absolute submission to any received authority. In as far as it has stymied the development 
of these essential attributes, development assistance and received authority from traditional7 
donors has played an adverse role by crippling the psychological independence of African 
policymaking. Inordinate aid dependence has fueled a state-deficit syndrome in economic 
planning. As it has been argued by Whitfield and Maipose (2008), some governments have thus 
accepted their subordinate position and the inevitability of donor involvement in policymaking 
and thus given up on national ownership and responsibility. 
China is breaking this psychological policy dependency. In terms of policy influence the most 
important contribution that China has brought into to Africa has been to increase the 
independence of African policy making and diminish the idea of development cooperation as a 
conduit of externally induced economic priorities. By expanding the sources of FDI and aid 
available to poorer countries, China, like other emerging donors, is expanding poorer nations‟ 
                                                             
6 http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/prsp/ 
7 In this paper „traditional donors‟, largely refers to the founder member of the OECD. 
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alternatives in procuring capital. An increased range of alternatives (choice) has consequently 
diminished the value of traditional donors‟ assistance and boosted Africa‟s latent negotiation 
resources in its economic relations. The fact that China is not propositioning Africa to follow or 
imitate its development strategy is a reflection of Chinese flexibility on the heterodox nature of 
economic development. This is a departure from traditional donors‟ proclivity to instruct 
African policy makers on the right policy and the subsequent crippling „search of approval‟ 
mentality which has permeated African policymaking for much of the last two decades. As 
Kabeberuka (2007) put it, it is instructive to note that China is not only expanding the policy 
choices but also the responsibility of African governments by increasing the „premium put on the 
ability to choose a set of optimal combinations‟ in policy.8 Thus China is helping in boosting the 
two psychological essentials of a development mindset - the freedom and responsibility - of 
African states in economic policy making.  
 
FROM STIPULATION TO NEGOTIATION -  CHINESE ROLE IN 
ENHANCING ECONOMIC D IPLOMACY  
 
Learning to be effective negotiators with other economies is going to be an essential policy skill 
for Africa‟s overall economic development. One of the key aspects of any negotiation is to be 
strategically „armed‟ with an objective and some negotiation resources such as better knowledge 
or an indispensable link. However, as far as economic diplomacy goes, it has been persuasively 
argued that often, African countries lack the capacity to influence or set the agenda and pace of 
negotiations during bilateral or multilateral negotiations with other parties (Osakwe, 2004). The 
idea that African states have a marginal influence on the agenda suggests that usually, African 
countries have little time to even crystallize their objectives in commercial negotiations. The 
question to ask is why African countries often participate in negotiation processes where their 
objectives are not clearly evident. The answer might lie in African countries‟ diminished 
confidence (psychological state) about „what they bring to the table‟ during a negotiation. Due to 
African countries sense of dependence on developed nations (particularly European Union 
countries), developed nations often use a strategic threat of suspending bilateral assistance 
programmes to enforce compliance of African states. There has thus been an axiomatic notion 
that any partnership/negotiation process involving an African country and an external party, the 
African country had very little to offer and thus the partner was only being generous in seeking 
the African country‟s partnership. As Oyejide and Njinken (2007) point out, African countries 
often go to the table with an erroneous believe that their best alternative to a negotiated 
Agreement (BATNA) would automatically be worse off than the status quo even when evidence 
points to the contrary.9   
                                                             
8 Emphasis (italicization) mine. 
9 This is best illustrated by (Oyejide and Njinken, 2007) in “African Preparation for Trade Negotiations in 
the Context of the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement” who for instance show that in the ongoing 
EPA negotiations between ACP and EU, African Least Developed Countries (LDCs) would have been 
best placed in keeping the status quo of their preferential treatment as LDCs. Yet, these LDCs too opted 
to enter the EPA negotiations and thus open themselves up for European goods which would be a worse 
of outcome than the existing arrangement. 
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By affirming the widespread demand for African commodities, China will increase some of 
African countries‟ strategic resources for negotiation and thus boost Africa‟s economic 
diplomacy. Africans can now see themselves as coming to the table to negotiate and not to be 
instructed. The premium on African resources represents a valuable negotiation resource. By 
empowering African economies and national agencies, China will therefore diminish an 
apathetic attitude to commercial negotiations by African countries and reduce African countries‟ 
disposition to concede too readily in economic negotiations. 
 
JUSTIFICATIONS  FOR  A  UNIFIED  AFRICAN  CHINA  
POLICY 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS :  THE PITFALLS OF AGGREGATION  
One of the paradoxical outcomes of 2006 China-Africa FOCAC Summit 10  was its role in 
cementing the idea of aggregated Afro-Chinese economic partnership as though African 
countries were engaging China as one political entity with unified interests. Although African 
leaders gathered in large numbers in Beijing at that summit, it was also clear that each African 
country had gone there seeking its own interests rather than pursuing an aggregated continental 
objective. Yet this summit cemented an erroneous putative view of Africa as a unified block in 
its external relations. Any aggregate talk of Sino-Africa relations without any actual collective 
continental projects is deceptive for a number of reasons.  
 
  
                                                             
10 FOCAC stands for the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation. The 2006 was the highest profile meeting 
between China and African leaders in the past decade. 
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Table I: Country Specific Distribution of Africa- Chinese Economic Relations 
(2007/2008) 
FDI TRADE ODA 
Country Amount in 
million USD 
% Country Amount 
in 
million 
USD 
% Country amount 
Total 15743.1  100 
 
Total 56.00 100    ? 
S.A 454.41   28.8 
 
Angola 20.60 24   
 
Angola ? 
Nigeria 390.35   24.7  
 
S.A 7.93 17  
 
Sudan ? 
Algeria 145.92   9.2 
 
Sudan 5.55 8   
 
Tanzania ? 
Zambia 119.34   7.5  
 
Egypt --       6 Zambia ? 
Niger 100.83   6.3  
 
Nigeria 0.48 7   
 
Ethiopia ? 
Libya 42.26   2.6  
 
Libya 2.55    
Angola 41.19   2.6  
 
Zambia 0.50    
   Congo 3.40    
Total  81.7  
 
  60-65
11
   
Source: (Investments and trade) http://hzs2.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/20080928/ 1222502733006.pdf 
World Investment Report 2008 – Country Fact sheet, UNCTAD; World Bank, Development Data, 
published September 24, 2008. http://www.devdata.worldbank.org; Ministry of Commerce of PRC. 
(ODA) Davies, Penny: China and the End of Poverty in Africa: Towards Mutual Benefit pg. 56/57 
One, it conceals the lopsided nature of African-Chinese economic relations. For instance at the 
2009 annual UNECA African economic conference last year (2009) some African scholars 
made the following two observations: 
„the Bilateral Africa-China trade is fairly balanced in recent times: Africa enjoyed a small 
trade surplus with China 2004-2006 ($2 billion per yr)12.  
„Africa‟s TOT [terms of trade] in relation to China improved by 80% to 90% b/w 2001-2006, 
due to rising world prices for oil and minerals exported to China in the face of stagnant or 
falling prices of manufactured goods imported from China‟.13  
                                                             
11 Tralac “Africa-China trading relationship – Update 2009” The major African trading partners with 
China for 2008 were Angola (24 %); South Africa (17 %); Sudan (8 %); Nigeria (7 %) and Egypt (6 %) in 
terms of total trade. Trade with these countries represents 62 % of China‟s total trade with Africa. 
http://www.tralac.org/cause_data/images/1694/Africa-China09.pdf  
12 Olu Ojakaiye/Ademola Oyejide/Francis Mwega et al. 2009. “China Africa Economic Relations: 
Insights for AERC Scoping Studies.” I italicize this to emphasize the aggregated notion of Africa as 
having a trade surplus with China. 
13 Olu Ojakaiye/Ademola Oyejide/Francis Mwega et al. 2009. “China Africa Economic Relations: 
Insights for AERC Scoping Studies.” 
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Such broad aggregations hide the huge trade imbalances that most African countries have with 
China. The danger of aggregated perception of Sino-African relations is that while Chinese 
commercial interests are disproportionately centered on a few resource rich countries, a broad 
aggregation hides the specific economic effects of Chinese firms‟ engagement in each individual 
African country. Although China may be principally only benefiting a few countries, an 
aggregated view gives the impression and false comfort of unified continental benefits.  
Table 2: Country Specific trade deficit with China 
Country  Trade deficit with China  
 
Egypt  US$ 4.5 billion  
 
South Africa  US$ 2.1 billion  
 
Kenya  US$ 892.5 million  
 
Cameroon  US$ 75 million  
 
Nigeria  US$ 52 milion  
 
Mauritius  US$ 34 million  
 
Zimbabwe  US$ 189 million  
 
Sources: (Kenya) Embassy of Kenya Beijing http://www.kenyaembassy.cn/content/content.aspx?kid=64  
(Nigeria) - Nigeria–China Business Council http://www.apanews.net/public/spip.php?article114258  
(Cameroon) INS 2006 (Khan and Baye, 2008)  
http://www.aercafrica.org/documents/asian_drivers_working_papers/Cameroon-China.pdf  
(Zimbabwe) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's_Republic_of_China_%E2%80%93_Zimbabwe_relations  
(South Africa) COSATU http://www.mbendi.com/land/as/cj/p0065.htm          
                                               
This is of course to the disadvantage of resource-low countries in Africa as outlined above in 
table 1 which shows the country specific distribution of Chinese economic relations in trade, aid 
and investment. As table 1 shows, out of 53 African states, only seven countries represent more 
than 80% of Chinese investment in Africa. Similarly seven countries represent more than 65% 
of trade with African countries.  
The notion of aggregate African trade surplus is therefore very restricted and indeed misleading 
as a number of African countries suffer huge trade deficits with China as table 2 above shows. 
Since continued reference to aggregate terms shows Africa as having a trade surplus, there is 
little realization and likely less urgency among African countries with lesser trade and huge 
deficits with China to more exigently seek an address of this imbalance. 
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Secondly, although cloaked in generous language14 , the Chinese refusal to disclose specific 
figures for its development assistance to individual African countries is in fact a strategic 
decision precipitated by a fear that giving specific figures on each country would raise 
accusations of favouritism among African countries and thus potentially raise the demands or 
grievances of some African countries. Thus, the so called 53-country aid strategy reflects China‟s 
sensitivity against favouritism (Davies, 2007). In essence, China is afraid of African countries 
solidarity in coalescing around fixing standards for its aid frameworks.  
Crafting an African „China Policy‟ would therefore compel individual states to examine the 
effect of China on their economy and lay a more emphatic claim to reciprocal relations as far as 
aggregated Afro-Chinese relations are concerned. To do this, an African „China Policy‟ would 
essentially compel an intra-African aggregation of states‟ interests and desired responses to 
China.  This way any Afro-Chinese talk would have agreeable economic components for each 
country or region. Additionally, in development cooperation, African supra-national institutions 
(such as the African Development Bank or the African Union) would then have a standardized 
framework for dealing with China in developing partnership programmes with veritable regional 
or even continental dimensions rather than having China deal exclusively with African countries 
bilaterally or as just a conglomeration of countries with parallel visions. An African „China policy‟ 
would give each African country a veritable platform to claim for nationally desired outcomes as 
well as to concede to the continental „aggregated‟ objectives. Such an agreement would also 
obviate or at least mitigate what Kaplinsky (2009) has called the „wars of incentives‟.  
African states could find inspiration for crafting a common China policy from their experiences 
with the ongoing Economic Partnership Agreements with the European Union. Although there 
are differences between each state‟s trade with the EU, some regions, such as the East African 
Community (EAC) reached common regional trade treaties with the EU. Such agreements are 
tough to reach. But when attained, they not only lock in a unified mode of commercial 
interaction with a third party but also contribute to regional convergence.  
 
EDGING OUT DOMESTIC BUSINESS –  RISING DISCONTENT  
 
The discontent about continued stiff competition by Chinese firms resulting in edging out 
African firms in domestic tenders, local import trade and major business sub-sectors is slowly 
rising as demonstrated by these few recent examples from East, West and Southern Africa 
below in box 1. While most governments have been lauding China – and readily awarding 
construction tenders to Chinese firms –, many locally owned businesses are strongly feeling the 
pressure from Chinese competition.  
 
                                                             
14 For the language and justifications used by China about this, see Penny Davies‟ “China and the End of 
Poverty in Africa” (2007) pp 49-50.  
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Box 1. Displacement of Domestic African Business by Chinese Firms15 
“China Quietly Usurps African Textile Market” (Ghana – Textiles)  
 
“Africa is going through a double whammy, as China has penetrated deeply into the African 
textile market, seriously dislocating the domestic textile companies in Africa. While Africa 
was hoping to cash in on the concessions being extended by both the US and the EU to 
promote its exports to both the countries, it is now facing a dilemma because of deluge of 
Chinese textiles. What China seems to be losing in the US market, appears to be made up in 
the African market. In Ghana, the textile industry continues to face challenges, amid growing 
competition from cheap imports from China. The Director General of Nigeria Textile 
Manufacturing Association (NTMA), Jolaoso Olarewaju, said between 1996 and 2006, the 
number of employees on the association's employment data had reduced from 250,000 to 
less than 30,000”                                       
Originally published in The Stitch Times: January 2010  
 
“China‟s march in Kenya upsets local firms” (Kenya – Construction)  
 
“A report by 14 universities in Africa under the aegis of the African Economic Research 
Consortium (AERC) released two months ago warned that increasing investment, foreign aid 
and diplomatic ties with China would hurt Kenya. Fears have been raised about threats to 
engineering talent and skills and the collapse of local construction companies due to 
invasion of Chinese construction firms, says the report. The researchers feel that Chinese 
firms are undercutting local companies and that the latter may collapse. They estimate that 
more than 50 per cent of construction activities in Nairobi, both private and state-sponsored, 
have been captured by Chinese construction firms usually preferred for projects ranging from 
roads, water systems, power generation and hospitals. Increasingly, the structure of 
employment is changing, with an increasing proportion of foreign employees in Chinese 
enterprises, says the report by the University of Nairobi Institute for Development Studies.”  
Originally published in The Daily Nation: January 23rd 2010  
 
 “Cosatu lambasts „Chinese tsunami‟” (South Africa - Textiles)  
 
ANGER is mounting in Africa, particularly in SA, about what the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (Cosatu) calls a “tsunami of cheap Chinese goods” stifling local industries and 
wiping out jobs. SA‟s textile union estimates 800 manufacturing units and 60000 jobs have 
disappeared in SA since 2001 because of unfair competition from China.  
Originally published in the Johannesburg BusinessDay: January 21 2010 
                                                             
15 China Quietly Usurps African Textile Market - http://www.articlesnatch.com/Article/China-Quietly-
Usurps-African-Textile-Market/927128 
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The hidden cost of Chinese efficiency is twofold. One, Chinese domination of business will 
become politically unsustainable if not checked in time. Already there have been sporadic clashes 
in several African countries targeted at Chinese traders and investors.  
Secondly, if proper competition policies are not adopted and enforced, African countries will 
lose out on their abilities to catch-up on technological transfers from Chinese companies. A 
unified policy will help African countries‟ businesses to anticipate and prepare for China‟s 
formidable entry into business in Africa.16 
 
EFFICIENCY VS BACKLASH –  CHINA’S ECONOMIC SUCCESS 
STIRS  DOMESTIC POLITICS  
 
In the long-run African countries cannot remain entirely unswayed by the effects and exigencies 
of domestic politics on trade policy.17 Although it seems that African countries do widely accept 
the ineluctable utility of competition in global business, the sudden flood of Chinese firms will 
likely lead to a political backlash that will be politically difficult to ignore as demonstrated at the 
recent FOCAC meeting. Rising frustration over China‟s ambiguous or doggy position on its 
effect on Africa‟s political economy may have finally been vented over at the Fourth Ministerial 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Egypt in November 2009.  
This nascent disenchantment was similarly expressed (though in a muted manner) by the post-
FOCAC AU Report ((EX.CL/544 (XVI) of January 2010. On the sidelines of the forum – the 
first major meeting between China and African countries since the 2008 economic crisis – 
African leadership might have signalled the end of a blanket embrace of China. At the meeting 
several high ranking African Ministers censured China‟s style of economic relations with Africa 
reminding China that its ambiguous disregard for domestic political ramification of its economic 
foray into African stats was not sustainable.18 As evidence for political backlash against the 
Chinese, there have been sporadic politically motivated attacks on Chinese in Cameroon as well 
deadly attacks in Ethiopia19. In Zambia, popular opposition to China has been particularly 
recognizable and has played a prominent role in national elective politics. Although most 
                                                             
16 for more recent examples of the local business responses to Chinese competition see „Africa: concerns 
over Chinese investment and working conditions‟ on http://www.ips.org/africa/2008/06/africa-
concerns-over-chinese-investment-and-working-conditions/ and „China: Outsmarting the West in African 
Markets‟ http://www.ips.org/africa/2010/07/china-outsmarting-the-west-in-african-markets/ 
17 The political economy trade policy is often tolerated even when it‟s not economically efficient. For 
example as a 1980s Cato Institute paper indicated European Agricultural Policy costs European 
consumers some $20 billion per year, for every $20,000 per year job protected in Swedish shipyards, 
Swedish taxpayers pay an estimated $50,000 annual subsidy. When Japanese consumers pay eight times 
the world price for beef, Japanese farmers are not eight times better off. See, J. Michael Fingers „The 
Political Economy of Trade Policy‟ Cato Journal Vol. 3, pp 1 
18 See  „Africa warns China: Money is not enough‟    
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/KL09Cb01.html 
19 http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-07/08/content_8398201.htm  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6588055.stm  
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African government have been able to withstand most of the backlash so far, this kind of 
backlash will become more attractive in populist democratic elections and thus more difficult to 
ignore or manage suitably with ad hoc solutions. This is a big task that would also have to be 
addressed by an African China policy, in the self-interest of both Africa and China.     
When the backlash against Chinese competition is taken up by trade unions (as in South Africa) 
and possibly supported by local manufacturers and industrialists (as in Ghana and Kenya), 
arguments for Chinese efficiency will increasingly become politically untenable. A sudden 
economic backlash could be injurious to both Chinese investors and even local manufacturers 
since (even in the event of sudden nationalistic consumption patterns), the domestic industries‟ 
capabilities in price and quality may be so badly eroded as to be unable to be credible substitute 
manufacturers of previously Chinese supplied commodities. An African policy therefore needs 
to ensure that governments suitably prepare both the consumer and the producer for the 
growing Chinese presence. 
 
CHINESE FDI,  EMPLOYMENT AND TECHNOLOGY –  COMPELLING 
LINKAGES IN DOMESTIC ECONOMIES  
 
In recent years African countries have been very active in courting FDI. Yet, although essential, 
the simple fact of increasing FDI is not sufficient for the requisite long-term and substantive job 
creation needed in most African countries. African countries should look at FDI and trade in a 
broader long-term, developmental perspective. Chinese aid, trade and FDI should not only be 
aimed at increasing government income (through licenses or privatization for instance), but at 
improving the long-term productive capabilities of a wide section of the populace. This can only 
be effected better by ensuring that the Chinese economic activities have wider linkages in the 
local economy in terms of employment, technology transfer and skills enhancement. The often 
more experienced managerial skill and more advanced technology of the Chinese business 
should be tapped into early by inaugurating a policy that facilitates this transfer. Chinese FDI 
should not be left to fortify itself in FDI “enclaves” that have few linkages with the rest of the 
economy. Linkages with local enterprises would be instrumental in enhancing broader 
productivity growth of domestic firms.  
 
CHINESE BUY-OUTS AND ACQUISITIONS –  THE NEXT HEADACHE  
 
In addition, governments and businesses in Africa should get prepared for the next phase of the 
Chinese investment in Africa. Chinese FDI stocks are still comparatively limited in Africa (van 
der Lugt et al. 2011), and a next phase is likely going to be buyouts (either partial or whole) and 
Mergers and Acquisitions of profitable African companies, as has already been seen in some 
countries (e.g. South Africa). Brand building is the aim of the 12th Five Year Plan in China and 
brand buying can be seen as a shortcut to enhancing Chinese local presence. A case in point is 
the purchase of 20% stake in Standard Bank, South Africa's largest bank by the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). Although Chinese business in Africa is not necessarily 
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supported by the Chinese State, for some companies, this acquisition is backed by the Chinese 
State with ample financial support as part of the Chinese “go-out” (zou chu qu) policy20.  
On this, several questions arise. Under what conditions will African government allow takeovers 
and acquisitions? Would African governments set aside some strategic companies that would be 
protected from potential acquisitions? If so what will be the selection criteria for such „strategic‟ 
companies? Should African governments initiate preemptive negotiations for agreements with 
Chinese companies to obviate domestic anxiety about these takeovers?  The argument here is 
not that African state must have stringent regulatory controls on FDI or financial flows or 
nationalization.  The argument is that African states should reflect on the lessons from other 
developing countries (South Korea, China, India, Malaysia and others) and how they handle 
economic liberalization in FDI, finance and ownership of business.  Particularly with regard to 
East Asian development, FDI was mostly seen as a way of technology transfer to local 
manufacturers. FDI was a means to „catch-up‟ and had an express „developmental‟ purpose. The 
argument therefore is that as much as possible, whether regionally or nationally there should be 
a deliberate strategic orientation21 for FDI in general and for Chinese FDI in particular.  
Therefore clear partnership mechanisms for creating dynamic learning and fostering 
competitiveness for domestic firms should be conceived and embraced within an African 
“Chinese Policy”.  Since such mechanisms (such as compulsory requirements on employment 
and training of domestic staff), may not necessarily be benign to Chinese FDI, such investors 
could resist their implementation and thus the need for a unified front by African countries. 
While many countries may have the ideas and intent of creating such linkages, pinning down the 
Chinese to adopt such domestic industry augmenting measures would require the combined 
muscle of the entire continent. Additionally for African countries to agree on such measures 
would not be easy as these measures would spell out and regulate some aspects of intra-Africa 
competition on FDI. However, if agreed, they would constitute a giant leap in intra-Africa 
convergence in policy. Thus an African “Chinese policy” provides a means of not only 
managing China but forging intra-African convergence on key policy areas such as competition 
and basic standards in FDI as van der Lugt et al. (2011) have argued. 
 
POLICY ACTION PLAN FOR ENGAGING CHINA  
REBALANCING WIN-WIN :  FROM ‘CADFUND ’  TO AN AFDB  TRUST-
FUND   
As part of its zou chu qu policy China already has the China-Africa Development Fund 
(CADFund) which is a USD$1 billion facility provided by the China Development Bank whose 
objective is to support Chinese companies who wish to invest in Africa. According to the 
Chinese this fund is meant to „to build up “bridge linking” and “connection” of the economic 
                                                             
20  Specific to Africa, China has the China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund) a USD$1 billion facility 
provided by the China Development Bank whose objective is to support Chinese companies who wish to 
invest in Africa 
21 For an example of South Korea‟s and Taiwan‟s strategic guidance of FDI see, Elizabeth Thurbon and    
Linda Weiss‟s „Investing in Openness: The Evolution of FDI strategy in South Korea and Taiwan.‟  
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and trade cooperation between China and Africa, enhance the self-development capability of 
Africa as well as to promote mutually beneficial and win-win between China and Africa by 
market-oriented operation‟.22 While this fund has potential to immensely benefit Africa in terms 
of enhancing FDI, for all intents and purposes, this fund is China-centric and primarily intended 
to achieve the interests of Chinese firms with little input of African partners as has been shown 
by Deborah Brautigum and Tang Xiaoyang in their work on African-Chinese Special Economic 
Zones. African countries cannot determine their interests and priorities since the fund is fully 
administered by the Chinese Development Bank. This leaves China‟s much hyped „win-win‟ 
intentions a little unbalanced.  While the Chinese „win‟ is assured, the African „win‟ is only 
tentative. In addition, this is a fund aimed at assisting the Chinese private sector as opposed to 
African public or private sector.  
A two-step approach should be taken to ensure a more balanced win-win-situation. First, as an 
exigent measure for developing projects with a veritable African (continental) ownership funded 
by the Chinese, African countries should establish a special trust fund administered by the 
AfDB. This would ensure that all African countries who are members of the AfDB would have 
a fair shot in promoting their interest with regard to Chinese FDI.  Second, as a counterpart of 
to the CADFund, African countries should set up a fund at the African Development Bank to 
deal with collective economic issues regarding China. Primary to the use of this fund would be 
the collective promotion of African economic interests in China. The set-up of such a fund 
would also goad the establishment of a minimal formal agreement on what such „collective 
African economic‟ issues would comprise. Once agreed the fund would go into funding such 
collective projects with a veritable regional or continental dimension. Similarly the fund could be 
used by individual countries in either enhancing its economic interests in China or mitigating 
injurious effects of Chinese commercial activities in the country.  
A Chinese targeted trust fund, administered by the AfDB would have two benefits. One it 
would facilitate convergence of the continent in determination of minimal collective interest 
with regard to China. Secondly, African countries, through such a fund, would have greater 
financial capabilities over how to embrace China. This could include- facilitating further entry of 
Chinese firms into targeted sectors in any give country, helping domestic firms to readjust to the 
Chinese onslaught with cheaper imports or even helping promote a given country‟s exports in 
China.  
SUPPORTING SELF-HELP :  TARGETING CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT FOR 
AFRICAN FIRMS AND WORKERS  
From an African perspective, a broad strategic orientation for Chinese FDI should be to reignite 
– not stymie – African industrialization. African countries have a lot to learn from the Chinese 
trade and FDI policy of the 1980s both in terms of contents, pace and sequencing. One of the 
most pressing challenges for any developing countries is how to stem unemployment. FDI is 
thus seen as key in alleviating unemployment. However, as jobs trickle in, the utility of FDI 
should similarly be focused on improvement of workers skills and technological transfer to local 
companies.  
                                                             
22 China Africa Development Fund- http://www.cadfund.com/en/Column.asp?ColumnId=51 
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In China for instance, it was not until after 1990 that wholly foreign owned enterprises were 
permitted in areas outside of Special Economic Zones (Tseng and Zebregs, 2002). Before then 
most FDI consisted of Equity Joint Ventures or Cooperative joint venture companies. The 
motivation for this requirement was simply to enhance local entrepreneurs‟ business skills as 
well as technological transfer to Chinese companies. To the Chinese, international joint ventures 
presented an ideal form for securing rapid access to capital, technology and export markets 
within an economy in transition (Dolles and Wimking, 2005).  
African governments should take queue and implement a similar policy with intent of enhancing 
technological transfer to domestic firms. Since African countries have, by this time, a good idea 
of the main target industries for Chinese FDI in their countries, focus should shift from mere 
volume of FDI to the effect of the FDI in employment creation and technological transfer. In 
addition, a vigilant policy on joint ventures23 would propitiate domestic firms into a state where 
foreign competition will be more readily acceptable. In anticipating external competition 
domestic companies will have an option of getting into a joint venture or going it alone. The 
idea is not to simply copy East Asian policy measures for growth and development, but at the 
minimum to have a deliberate conscious strategic orientation for Chinese FDI.  
  
                                                             
23 This policy suggestion is made within an understanding the GATS article XVI stipulations and 
limitations. Article XVI makes reference to (i) prohibiting measures which restrict or require specific types 
of legal entity or joint venture, and (ii) prohibiting measures which require maximum percentage limit on 
foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment. However since as of 
2006 (post WTO entry) China still did require a minimum of 25% of the capital must from the foreign 
partner(s), this suggests that if pursued collectively, African states could find a way of using joint ventures.  
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-04/17/content_569167.htm 
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HOW TO GO ABOUT IT :   
FOUR URGENT MATTERS IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA 
1  SET STANDARDS ON EQUITY JOINT-VENTURES  
Set clear minimum requirements on equity joint ventures and cooperative joint ventures for 
Chinese companies investing in certain strategic target sectors for enhancement of technology 
transfer. This will have the incidental effect of precipitating governments to ponder the question 
of the relevance of and aspirations for any given strategic industries. An inspiration could be 
found in how the Nigerian government has partnered with Chinese companies in developing 
mostly Chinese-funded Special Economic Zones in these countries. Nigerian government 
agencies have substantial ownership of shares (40%) in the development. As Brautigum and 
Xiaoyang (2011) show in their study of Chinese funded development of Special Economic 
Zones in Africa, the intensity of local personnel involvement in any grand FDI project such as 
the SEZs is predicated on the percentage of local share (ownership). The higher the African 
share of funding, the greater the participation of high level African personnel.  In the Nigerian 
Lekki and Ogun SEZs, Nigerian participation is robust both in funding and top personnel.  
 
2 MAKE UNAMBIGUOUS STIPULATIONS ON CURBING FOREIGN 
WORKERS  
Enact strict limits on the number of foreign workers that each Chinese company can bring into 
African countries. This should be particularly pertinent for unskilled workers in construction or 
mining jobs. This would have the effect of not only raising local employment (in cases where the 
Chinese had brought their own workers), but also exposing and improving working relations 
between the Chinese and local workers.  Again, As Brautigum and Xiaoyang (2011) show, 
different countries have already developed national guidelines on the ratio of Chinese workers to 
local workers to be licensed for Chinese funded projects. In Egypt; one Chinese for seven 
Egyptians, in Nigeria at least 40% of the workers should be Nigerian. Countries without even 
tentative guidelines such as Zambia and Mauritius have been swamped by a surge in Chinese 
workers. The next step should be to rationalize and possibly converge these guidelines on 
regional or continental levels. 
  
3 PUSH CHINA TO CONSIDER VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINT (VER)   
Across the continent the textiles industry has been worst hit by the influx of cheaper Chinese 
textiles. This hit has lead to major losses in manufacturing jobs for most African countries. 
Similarly African manufacturing has been hit by Chinese competition abroad. Kenya, Lesotho 
and Swaziland, all saw their exports of clothing under the African Growth and Opportunities 
Act (AGOA) preferences drop sharply when the end of the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) 
allowed Chinese garments unlimited entry into the US market (Kaplinsky et al 2007). Under the 
WTO regulations, African countries have little recourse, one of which would be to seek a 
voluntary export restraint on the part of Chinese manufactured textiles.  
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For almost all major industrial economies today [more recently Japan, Korea, Taiwan and now 
China and Bangladesh], the textiles industry has been an important massive employer of semi-
skilled labor and a launching pad to industrial sophistication both in knowledge and technology. 
Due to the assured demand for clothing, the textile industry is one that can still be salvaged in 
African countries. The longevity of the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) which is today known as 
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing is evidence that if well negotiated African countries 
could still salvage their textiles manufacturing industry by negotiating either a voluntary export 
restrains or re-negotiating on export quotas.  
It is instructive that South Africa was able to negotiate a Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) for 
textiles with China in 2006. African countries could tap into South Africa‟s experiences and 
angle for a continental extension of that VER. A VER by China could also potentially have the 
incidental and propitious effect of encouraging Chinese firms to actually set their factories in 
Africa in order to circumvent the VER. This would in turn increase FDI, technology transfer 
and employment in African countries.  
 
4 ISSUE A CALIBRATED CONVERGENCE POLICY ON REDUCTION OF 
AID DEPENDENCY  
The average amount of aid to Sub-Saharan Africa as a percentage of the total national income is 
actually low at 4%. Still, aid dependency should be an immensely valid issue of concern to 
African countries because to a certain extent, the level of aid dependency does influence the 
level of national ownership of the entire policy making agenda. In addition, as shown below, in 
spite of the low continental average many African countries still do rely on aid for substantial 
portions (in excess of 10%) of their national income.  
 
Table 3: Aid as a Percentage of Gross National Income in Select African countries  
Country Aid (as % of GNI) Country Aid (as % of GNI) 
Burundi 47.9% Burkina Faso  13.8% 
Sierra Leone 32.7% Mali 13.8% 
Mozambique 24.4% DR Congo 13.1% 
Malawi  20.6% Niger 12.8% 
Tanzania  17.4% Madagascar 12.2% 
Uganda 14.8% Zambia/CAR 10.4% 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2007 
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Admittedly, aid is not necessary debt but concern has been raised that Chinese aid might have 
an effect of exacerbating African countries debt24 and aid dependency. As old debts are being 
cleared, there is growing concern among traditional donors of the possible future debt burden 
on African countries, given the heavy concessionary loans being provided by China (Kaplinsky, 
2009). The fear is that China could re-indebt poor African nations by lending loosely and 
unconditionally.  In fact the US, the G7 and other traditional creditors have been vociferous 
trying to tie China down under traditional lending practices.25  
It might seem like a far cry, but just as the EU has set up caps on the percentage of fiscal deficits 
in its member Euro-zone states, in a bid to reduce aid dependency in Africa (as well as manage 
China‟s lending) African states should set up a policy on the maximum limits for aid as a 
percentage of the GNI – provisionally below 10% and possibly a further 1-2 % annual reduction 
for those countries already below 10%.  
At the face value such a policy would deter countries from reckless „over borrowing‟ from China. 
More fundamentally however, if such a policy were adopted it would open the door for 
enhanced regional convergence in African fiscal policy. Such a policy would open up each 
economy to enhanced scrutiny from a supranational monitoring institution (the AU or AfDB 
perhaps) to ensure compliance to healthy fiscal environment in African economies. At a time 
when economies are ever closely intertwined, such a policy would be step towards Africa‟s 
regionalisation aspiration. An attempt at regionalisation of fiscal policy is already happening in 
Africa with various distinct schemes for regionalisation by different regional economic blocs.26 
Mitigation against escalation of debt due to Chinese lending could accelerate this fiscal 
convergence.   However, there is little in way of vigilant scrutiny or penalties for defaulting. The 
entry of Chinese aid into the fray should enhance this convergence.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Whether with the European Union, Japan, the United States or China, the conduct of African 
foreign economic relations is characterised by two distinct hurdles: One, is the issue of giving 
content to the ideal of a collective and unified „African‟ policy. While the idea of a collective 
„African‟ polity is often taken as putative, the content of what a unified „African‟ policy for 
engaging any of these major economies is non-existent. While most major economies/regions 
have something of a unified set of principles to guide their economic relations with Africa, for 
                                                             
24 Debt is only a proportion of aid that mainly arises from bilateral or multilateral lending as opposed to 
grants. The OECD reports that in 2009 net ODA rose 0.7% in real terms and while grants grew by 4.6% 
bilateral lending grew by 20.6%. As lending is growing faster than grants this implies that the question of 
debt sustainability is still very relevant for African countries. 
http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3343,en_2649_34487_44981579_1_1_1_1,00.html 
25 For more on the debate on Chinese aid and the G7efforts at trying down China see Ngaire Woods 
paper, “Whose aid, Whose Influence? Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development 
Assistance”. 
26 SADC for instance has some of the more ambitious standards for fiscal convergence where by it has set 
the regional targets for inflation stability (6–9 percent range.), budget deficits ratio to GDP (± 3 percent 
range.), ratio of public and publicly guaranteed debt to GDP (no larger than 40%) and the balance and 
structure of the Current Account (no larger than 6 percent).  
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most part African states do not have an equivalent unified and cogent guideline to pursue their 
objective and strategies with regard to other economies.    The second hurdle concerns the issue 
of how African states can develop and execute an effective economic policy for engaging such 
economies as China. This paper starts from the premise that growing Chinese-African economic 
relations gives a basis for addressing these hurdles with regard to China.  
Much of the debate on the rapidly developing economic relations between Africa and China so 
far has tended to focus on the pros and cons of these economic ties. As this paper proposes 
however, rather than merely vacillating between excitement and loathing of China, Africa should 
embrace China with policy in order to reap constructively from Chinese-African economic ties. 
In moving beyond the pro vs. con debate, the paper thus seeks to provide policy proposals for a 
collective African framework for engaging China.  
From recent experiences of Africa-Chinese economic relations, it‟s becoming more patent that 
individual African countries are faced with similar sets of opportunities and threats. On threats, 
African countries are first and foremost faced with a huge economic power (China) which raises 
problems of power asymmetry in any economic negotiations and agreement. Similarly, they all 
face problems arising from ferocious competition from Chinese firms which tends to thin out 
domestic industry, huge trade deficits with China, unwanted surges in Chinese labour as well as 
the dim prospect of „racing to the bottom‟ in competition for Chinese investment. This 
commonality of threats, the paper argues should precipitate considerations for a united front to 
craft an African-Chinese policy to guide economic relations with China. These shared problems 
would guide African states in giving content to an African Chinese policy. Moreover, an 
initiative for an African-Chinese policy should be done while African-Chinese relations are still 
in an environment of mutual accommodation.  As was evidenced from nascent disenchantment 
over China at the 2009 China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting, the good will between 
Africa and China is not infinite. 
Some policy proposals discussed in this paper include; One, the set-up of a Chinese targeted 
fund (apart from China‟s CADFund) for among other things use by African countries in 
mitigation of disenfranchisement of domestic business due to the Chinese entry. Such a fund 
would also be useful in funding the development of a collective institutional framework for 
dealing with China. The fund would also be aimed fostering minimum veritable intra-Africa 
agreements on collective interests with regard to China. Also discussed is a viability of 
negotiating a Voluntary Export Restrain (VER) for China exports to Africa- especially for 
certain massively affected subsectors such as textiles. Thirdly the paper discusses a set of policies 
that would be aimed at ensuring that Chinese FDI, technology, and managerial skills have 
linkages to the local economy and finally an intra-Africa policy on placing caps on loans (debt) 
as a percentage of the national income. This would ensure that African countries do not borrow 
recklessly from China and thus obviate any sharp increases in African countries debt as a result 
of „generous‟ Chinese aid.  African policies for embracing China would not only be useful in 
Africa‟s continental economic diplomacy with China, but would also fundamentally enhance 
regional policy convergence within Africa. Thus the entry of China does present opportunities 
for regional convergence.  
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